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Switch cut at Khabarovsk II station of the Far Eastern Railway on November 4, 2025

Tel. No. ISKh-28125 from November 14, 2025

November 4, 2025, at 10:59 p.m. Moscow time at the station. During shunting operations (locomotive first) on a 71-car train at Khabarovsk II, diesel locomotive No. 1482, registered as TChE Khabarovsk II, driven by a driver (working without an assistant driver) at a speed of 7.5 km/h, the train passed the NM83 signal with a red light, subsequently cutting switch No. 850.

Circumstances:

The investigation established that the DSP informed the driver of the shunting plan, which the driver confirmed. While moving from the N2S signal, the driver, due to a lapse in vigilance, became distracted from operating the locomotive and monitoring the signal, resulting in the train passing the NM83 signal.

During an inspection of the locomotive, damage to the insulation of the power supply wires of the TSKBM safety device on the terminal strip was discovered, indicating the installation of a temporary jumper to disable the device. This is confirmed by the absence of a periodic TSKBM alertness check for 10 hours and 51 minutes, and the presence of eight checks within 48 minutes after passing a traffic light, recorded on an electronic device.

Reasons:

The cause of the admitted traffic safety violation was the driver's lapse in alertness while performing his duties due to poor preparation for the upcoming shift and tampering with the safety devices.

Resolved:

To all Ts, TChEs:

1.1. Organize and conduct, in accordance with established procedures, an unscheduled briefing on the admitted traffic safety violations.

1.2. As part of the Safety Culture Days, inform TChE teams of the circumstances and root causes of the aforementioned traffic safety violations.

1.3. By December 26, 2025, verify the ordinates of traffic lights to determine whether the distance between them is less than the braking distance, and then compare them with the data entered in the Local Brake Control Instructions. Organize an update of these instructions, if necessary.

1.4. By January 30, 2026, submit the results of the verification of the ordinates of traffic lights with distances less than the braking distance to DI and JSC NIIAS to update the relevant regulatory framework.

1.5. Establish a procedure for issuing a list of traffic lights located at a distance less than the braking distance to locomotive crew members by section, in accordance with the issued reports.

1.6. In November-December 2025, include in the targeted inspection plan a task to inspect locomotives for unauthorized installation of jumpers and the use of "cheats" of the TSKBM safety device.

1.7. Chief engineers of locomotive operating depots are to verify the availability and relevance of organizational documents at the TChE establishing the procedure for using the TSKBM when permitting locomotive crews to work, and the actual performance of periodic inspections of the PNC devices, the TSKBM wearable parts worn by employees before a trip (shift), and the availability of the TSKBM-N transition reserve at the TChD.

2. T DVOST, in accordance with the procedure established by JSC Russian Railways, is to conduct an investigation into the traffic safety violation committed at Khabarovsk II station, applying disciplinary measures to the employees involved.

3. Submit a report on the work performed by 10.02.2026 via the Unified Automated Data System (EADS) to the address "Anton Yuryevich Pakhomenko."

4. I personally entrust T to oversee the execution of this telegram.

TsZ-TsT D.V. Pegov

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