When information is missing...
By and large, this topic has been stuck in my teeth for a long time. After all, almost every issue of the magazine "Locomotive" publishes materials about violations that lead to disastrous consequences. However, the situation in some depots is not changing for the better. Locomotive crews continue to ignore the basic requirements of PTE, instructions and orders. And the heads of the line divisions of the various services involved in the movement of trains cannot find a clear understanding. Moreover, they don't even bother to inform their fellow neighbors about any changes. Evidence of this is the next passage of the prohibition signal on Oktyabrskaya road.
It all happened on an ordinary bright day. On February 21, 2008, at 3:23 p.m., the locomotive crew of the St. Petersburg-Passazhirsky-Moskovsky depot, consisting of Class II engineer A.S. Danilin and assistant B.D. Demyashin, allowed passage of the forbidding M417 traffic light at a speed of 14 km/h, followed by the descent of the CS2T electric locomotive with all wheelsets and one car.
The attendant at the St. Petersburg-Tovarny-Moskovsky station, L.E. Sazhina, gave permission via train radio to the driver to depart from track No. 90 according to the permissive indication of the M83 shunting traffic light onto the 4th freight track, duplicating the command of the DSP, A.S. Danilin set the train in motion. Following the permissive indications of the M83, M63 and M17 traffic lights in the mouth of the station, the locomotive crew was distracted from monitoring the signals and did not comply with the negotiation rules. As a result, she allowed passage of the forbidding (red) indications of the M417 shunting traffic light.
The reason for the passage of the forbidding signal was a gross violation of clauses 15.24 of the PTE and clause 11.24 of the IDP. Specifically, the driver and the assistant were distracted from monitoring the signals and the position of the switches, they were not convinced of the presence of a permissive indication of the M417 maneuvering traffic light. And how could the crew fulfill the requirements of the local "Instructions on the maintenance and organization of traffic on the traction tracks of the repair and equipment depot (RED) of the St. Petersburg-Passazhirsky-Moskovsky wagon section" if they had no idea about it?!
The leaders of the Oktyabrskaya Road arrived at the Russian Railways to analyze this case without fully clarifying the reasons and circumstances that led to the passage of the forbidding signal. By the way, the detailed analysis was preceded by an on-site inspection. It turned out that the preventive work in many depots of the road to prevent the passage of forbidding signals is poorly carried out. For example, the requirements of telegraphic instruction No. VG-11045 dated 04.10.2007 on the occasion of receiving a train on an unprepared route at the Moscow-Tovarnaya-Smolenskaya station have not been fulfilled. For some reason, the telegram on the occasion of the passage of the prohibition signal, prepared and sent to the enterprises of the Oktyabrskaya road, lists only the violations committed by the main culprit, the locomotive crew, and does not indicate other violations uncovered during the investigation.
As revealed by the special commission, the road has not developed a procedure for making changes to the TRA stations, ensuring timely receipt and study by related services and line enterprises. So, a dumping shoe was installed on the 4th track of the St. Petersburg-Tovarny-Moskovsky station, changes were made to the TRA of this station on December 12, 2007, and the depot found out about it only after the passage of the forbidding signal and the derailment of the electric locomotive, i.e. more than two months later!
When checking the changes that occurred in the TRA stations from August to December 2007, it was revealed that this case is not an isolated one. The depot has not received the changes made to the TRA stations of St. Petersburg-Main, St. Petersburg-Tovarny-Moskovsky, St. Petersburg-Finlyandsky, Mga and Malaya Vishera. Is it any wonder that a locomotive and a carriage converge if there is no business contact and exchange of important information between enterprises of different road services?
The local "Instruction on the maintenance and organization of traffic on the traction tracks of the repair and equipment depot (RED) of the St. Petersburg-Passazhirsky-Moskovsky wagon section" has not been agreed with the specialists of the locomotive department of the road department, and its individual points contradict the requirements of the IDP and PTE. The order of departure from the RED tracks is defined as for shunting trains, however, the driver is given a VU-45 certificate and a warning with the train number.
Before departure, the driver must receive a radio notification from the three DSP corresponding posts about the readiness of the route and the possibility of starting movement, however, the procedure for receiving it is not defined in the instructions and, accordingly, this point is practically not fulfilled. The location of the brake check along the route is determined when driving along the switch street of the station after departure from the RED tracks to the NM6 signal and distracts the locomotive crew from monitoring the position of the arrows and signal readings.
Why do the locomotive workers not pay attention to these violations?7 In the same St. Petersburg-Passazhirsky-Moskovsky depot, not a single entry was made in the Book of Comments of the drivers, nor is it reflected in the acts of sudden inspections and control procedures conducted by the command and instructor staff, the repeated demands of telegraphic instructions and orders of Russian Railways regarding the revision of local instructions, the locomotive maintenance service and the command and training staff of the depot were also ignored.
In order to strengthen preventive work to ensure traffic safety, managers of all levels of the locomotive industry of roads must, within 10 days, familiarize employees with the causes and circumstances of the incident under signature, and instruct locomotive crews with an entry in the technical form. During the briefing, it is necessary to re-work the telegraphic instruction No. VG-11045 dated 04 10 2007 on the occasion of receiving a train on an unprepared route at the Moscow-Tovarnaya-Smolenskaya station. It is also necessary to compare all the changes and additions made to the TRA of the stations of the serviced sections with the subsequent familiarization of the locomotive crews under the painting.
In an order signed by the head of the Locomotive Department of JSC Russian Railways, Yu.A. Mashtaler, the heads of the relevant line enterprises were asked to appoint those responsible for timely receiving information on changes to the TRA stations and organizing their study. It is also necessary to review the technology of working with passenger trains at formation stations and local instructions within a month, defining the procedure for their preparation, testing brakes, and moving from fleet to fleet in accordance with current instructions.
N.N. SHVETSOV,
Deputy Head of the Department of Locomotive Industry of JSC "Russian Railways"
23.02.2023, 01:41
Почта
