Locomotive Derailment at Switch Point at Konarmeyskaya Station of the North Caucasus Railway on October 16, 2025

[Admin]

Locomotive Derailment at Switch Point at Konarmeyskaya Station of the North Caucasus Railway on October 16, 2025

Tel. No. ISKh-27424 from November 5, 2025

On October 16, 2025, at 8:38 a.m., at Konarmeyskaya Station, S-KAV diesel locomotive No. 2134, registered at TChE Bataysk, was shunting. The S-KAV, driven by a driver from the same depot, was allowed to pass the M4 shunting signal with a red light, followed by derailment at Switch Point No. 4SO.

Circumstances:

The investigation established that on October 16, 2025, the Konarmeyskaya shunting station dispatcher communicated a shunting plan to the locomotive driver. The plan consisted of two half-trips, including starting from track #6, from shunting signal M18, past shunting signal M8, to shunting signal M4 with a prohibiting signal, from the shunting signal along free track #1, past shunting signal M1, and from shunting signal M8 along free track #3, past shunting signal M1.

After duplicating the communicated shunting plan and receiving confirmation from the dispatcher that it had been correctly understood, the driver, in the presence of a permissive signal from shunting signal M18 and a command from the dispatcher that the route was ready, set the locomotive in motion.

While passing shunting signal M18, the driver, in violation of paragraph 33 of Appendix No. 10 to the Instructions for the Organization of Train Traffic and Shunting Operations on Russian Railways and Appendix No. 2 to the Rules for the Technical Operation of Railways of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the TOR), approved by Order No. 250 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation dated June 23, 2022, failed to observe the indications of shunting signal M4. In violation of paragraph 68 of the TOR, he was distracted from operating the locomotive (he was filling out the locomotive logbook, Form TU-152), and consequently allowed the locomotive to pass.

During further movement, due to failure to observe the position of the turnouts, he allowed the locomotive to derail on the No. 4SO switching point with five wheelsets.

Operative Part:

To prevent the risk of a recurrence of the aforementioned traffic safety violations:

1. All TChEs:

1.1. In accordance with the requirements of the Procedure for Conducting Traffic Safety Briefings for Locomotive Crew Employees Involved in Ensuring Train Movement, and the study by locomotive crew employees of the technical and administrative acts of JSC Russian Railways railway stations, approved by JSC Russian Railways Order No. 1346/r dated June 5, 2023, organize an unscheduled briefing on the traffic safety violation;

1.2. In November 2025, as part of the Safety Culture Days, communicate the circumstances and main causes of the traffic safety violation to depot staff during planning meetings and work assemblies;

1.3. Command and instruction staff within the Central Processing Center and the Control Center shall inspect the shunting procedures at stations by drivers working without an assistant driver, paying attention to instances of drivers being distracted from operating the locomotive;

1.4. All Ts shall review the results of implementing the requirements of paragraphs 1.1–1.3 of this telegram in December 2025.

2. I personally assign Ts to oversee the implementation of this telegram.

Central Control Center D.V. Pegov

[СЦБот]

Эта тема была перенесена из раздела Комната совещаний.

Перенес: Admin. Держитесь и всего вам доброго.