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Shunting Locomotive Derailment at Remontnaya Station, North Caucasus Railway, September 23, 2025

At Remontnaya Station on September 23, 2025, at 11:27 AM, the sixth wheelset of ChME-3 shunting locomotive No. 2910 derailed in the direction of travel as a result of passing a red light on the M16 shunting signal.

Circumstances:

The investigation revealed that on September 23, 2025, at 8:07 AM, the signaling and control electrician entered an entry in the inspection log, Form DU-46, for work to measure the insulation resistance of cable cores relative to ground at switch No. 18/20SO.

At 11:17 AM, with permission from the duty officer at Remontnaya Station (hereinafter referred to as DSP), a signaling and interlocking (SIB) electrician removed the shackles from cross-over cabinet No. 33 NZZ-2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and N43-2.4 to measure the insulation resistance of the cable lines relative to ground with minimal interruption to the installation. This resulted in a loss of control of switch No. 18/20SO. After the SIB electrician installed the shackles on the cross-over cabinet and restored the working and control circuits of the switches, the negative position control on the control apparatus was no longer active.

In violation of paragraph 4.3 of the Instructions for the Maintenance and Repair of Signaling, Centralization, and Blocking Devices and Systems, approved by JSC Russian Railways Order No. 3168/r dated December 30, 2015, S., the signaling and blocking electrician, failed to check the operation of the switch and the signaling and blocking system upon completion of the work.

At 11:24 a.m., the shunting locomotive dispatcher communicated the shunting plan to the train dispatcher and the engineer of ChMEZ locomotive No. 2910. According to the plan, the shunting locomotive was to depart track No. 2 past signal M10, then proceed from signal M10 along track No. 1 past signal M1. From signal M1, it was to proceed past signal M7 onto occupied track No. 5, connect with 10 cars, test the brakes, remove two brake shoes from under the train, and proceed with a group of 10 cars past signal M1 onto the third available track. On track No. 3, five cars were to be secured with two brake shoes. The remaining five cars were to be moved to occupied track No. 5 and secured as a separate group with two brake shoes.

After duplicating the shunting plan and receiving confirmation from the shunting control center, the TCMT set locomotive No. 2910 in motion and proceeded from track No. 2 past shunting signal M10. While preparing the route from signal M10 to signal M1, due to the lack of control over the position of switch No. 18/20SO, shunting signal M16 failed to open to the clearing signal. The route was prepared from signal M10 to signal M16. At 11:26 AM, the TCMT set the locomotive in motion from signal M10.

At 11:27 AM, the TCMT set the point handle of switch No. 18/20SO to the minus position. After the minus position control for switch No. 18/20SO appeared on the control unit, the TCMT set the point handle to the plus position.

At 11:27 a.m., the driver of a shunting locomotive passed the red light of the M16 shunting signal and entered the isolated section of the 18-20 SP. Due to the paired switch control system, switch No. 20SO is set first, followed by switch No. 18. The locomotive followed switch No. 18 with five wheelsets in the direction of track No. 3, and the last wheelset in the direction of travel proceeded in the direction of track No. 1 after switch No. 18 was set, resulting in the derailment of the sixth wheelset in the direction of travel.

Violations committed by the driver:

The basis for executing the subsequent semi-trip from the completed shunting plan is the green light of the shunting signal; no further instructions are required.

In violation of paragraph 5.4 of the Procedure for Conducting Official Communications on the Infrastructure of JSC Russian Railways during the Organization of Train Movement and Shunting Operations, Assignment of Rolling Stock, and Monitoring Its Implementation, approved by Order No. 697/r of March 22, 2023, the driver failed to personally verify the indication of the M16 shunting signal and the position of the switches.

In violation of paragraph 33 (2) of Appendix No. 10 to the IDP, the driver failed to monitor the signals being given during shunting and failed to follow signals and movement instructions.

In violation of paragraph 35 of Appendix No. 10 to the IDP, the driver failed to follow the indication of the M16 shunting signal while traveling along the station track.

Violations committed by the station duty officer:

In violation of paragraph 15 of Appendix No. 20 to the station duty officer, when it was impossible to prepare a shunting route for the entire route from signal M10 to track No. 1 (in accordance with the submitted plan), she failed to indicate to the locomotive driver signal M16 with a prohibiting indication, restricting the locomotive's movement along the station track;
In violation of paragraph 5.3 of the Procedure for Conducting Official Communications on the Infrastructure of JSC Russian Railways during the Organization of Train Movement and Shunting Operations, Assignment of Rolling Stock, and Monitoring Its Execution

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