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Cutting of the switch at the Orel station of the Moscow Railway on December 13, 2025

On December 13, 2025, at 1:34 p.m., at the Orel railway station
of the Orel-Kursk Center for the Organization of Railway Station Operations of the Moscow Traffic Management Directorate, shunting signal M9 with a prohibiting signal was allowed to pass, followed by cutting of switch No. 5.

According to the shunting plan, a 42-car train located on track No. 19 of the marshalling and dispatch yard of the Orel railway station was to be broken up.

At 1:31 p.m. After preparing the route, the central control station operator transmitted a command via station radio to the shunting locomotive driver and the Orel railway station's train dispatcher to move the shunting train from track No. 19 beyond point No. 25 (within the boundaries of his control area), which the locomotive driver confirmed.
At 1:32 PM, the locomotive began moving forward from track No. 19 of the marshalling and dispatch yard toward pull-out track No. 33 for subsequent break-up at the low-power marshalling yard.
At 1:34 PM, while traveling along pull-out track No. 33 at a speed of 10 km/h, the train passed shunting signal M9 with a prohibiting signal, followed by cutting of switch No. 5. The train was stopped by emergency braking at the command of the central control station operator. As a result of the permitted passage, no rolling stock derailed, and train service at the Orel railway station was not interrupted.

During the investigation into the circumstances and causes of this incident, violations of the Russian Federation Rules for the Technical Operation, approved by Order No. 250 of the Russian Ministry of Transport dated June 23, 2022, were established:

The operator of the interlocking station at the Orel railway station:

in violation of the requirements of paragraph 8 of Appendix No. 10 to the IDP and Appendix No. 2 to the IDP, failed to prepare a shunting route for the entire route of the shunting train;
in violation of the requirements of paragraph 30 of Appendix No. 10 to the IDP and Appendix No. 2 to the IDP, failed to check the correct position of the switches on the shunting route before transmitting a message about the route readiness for the shunting train;
In violation of paragraph 2.1 of the Instructions on the Procedure for the Use of Railway Traffic Control Devices for Low-Capacity Humps, approved on February 15, 2024, No. MOSK-1114/pd, before commencing shunting operations, failed to ensure that the M5–M9 section was under local control based on the readings of the control devices;
In violation of paragraph 5.1 of the Procedure for Conducting Official Negotiations on the Infrastructure of JSC Russian Railways during the Organization of Train Movement and Shunting Operations, approved by Order No. 697/r of JSC Russian Railways dated March 22, 2023, when communicating the shunting plan, failed to report the prohibiting indication of traffic light M9. ===The shunting dispatcher at the Orel railway station: ===
In violation of the requirements of paragraph 2.3 of the Instructions for the Operation of a Low-Power Hump, approved on March 9, 2021, failed to inform the train dispatcher of the weight of the shunting train and the need to engage and test the automatic brakes on the shunting train.

The train dispatcher at the Orel railway station:

In violation of the requirements of paragraph 2.3 of the Instructions for the Operation of a Low-Power Hump, approved on March 9, 2021, before moving the shunting train onto the No. 33 extension track, failed to engage and test the automatic brakes on 8 loaded brake axles or 16 empty brake axles (with the train weighing 1,609 tons).

The Head of the Orel Railway Station:

in violation of the requirements of paragraph 5 of Section III of the Regulation on the Organization of Investigation and Recording of Transport Accidents and Other Events Related to Violations of Traffic Safety Rules and Operation of Rail Transport at JSC Russian Railways, approved by Order of JSC Russian Railways dated July 20, 2021 No. 1560/r, failed to promptly inform the parties involved of the traffic safety violation in the prescribed manner;
in violation of the requirements of paragraph 27 of the Instructions for Drawing Up a Technical and Administrative Act of a Railway Station and Appendices Thereto at JSC Russian Railways, approved by Order of JSC Russian Railways dated June 15, 2023 No. 1462/r, failed to ensure that the train dispatcher was familiar with the Regulations for Negotiations at the Orel Railway Station, approved
on December 2, 2025 No. DTS-5/2346/pd. I consider the current situation unacceptable, and therefore I order the heads of the railway station operation centers to:
1. Organize, within three days, a production briefing for the involved railway station employees regarding the circumstances and causes of the traffic safety violation that occurred at the Orel railway station.
2. In December 2025 and January 2026, the National Security Department and the heads of the centers are to organize targeted inspections of the shunting train relocation procedure, focusing on compliance with route discipline, the activation and testing of automatic brakes in shunting trains, compliance with the established regulations for official negotiations, and the procedure for interaction between railway employees and

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